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REAL PROPERTY-MORTGAGES-LIABILITY OF MORTGAGEE OF LESSEE'S 
TERM FOR RENT-Respondent leased a building to South Texas Kitchens, 
Inc., for a term of five years. The lessee became indebted to petitioner and, 
being unable to meet this obligation, transferred its business assets and 
lease to petitioner as security.1 Petitioner was authorized to manage the 
business and to apply all proceeds to discharge the indebtedness, the trans-
fer to terminate when the debt was fully paid. Petitioner went into pos-
session of the premises and operated the business for about six months, pay-
ing the rent during that period. It then vacated the property and ceased 
making rental payments. Respondent sued petitioner and the lessee in an 
action for rent and recovered a judgment against both. On appeal by 
petitioner only, held, reversed. A mortgage is only a security device and does 
not vest all of the mortgagor's title and estate in the mortgagee. A mortgagee 
in possession2 of the mortgaged premises is not an assignee of .the lease and 
thus is not liable on the covenant of rent. Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor, (Tex. 
1958) 317 S.W. (2d) 47. 
An assignee of a lease is liable on covenants running with the lease3 
while a sub-lessee is not. The execution of the lease places the lessee in 
privity of estate with the lessor.4 A .transfer by the lessee of his entire interest 
in the lease terminates his privity of estate and creates privity of estate be• 
tween the lessor and the transferee,5 the latter becoming an assignee. On 
the other hand, where the transfer leaves the lessee with a reversion,s or in 
some jurisdictions with a right of re-entry,7 the transferee is a sub-lessee 
rather than an assignee 
1 The court assumed that this was a mortgage. 
2 See note 12 infra. 
3 As a general rule, for a covenant to run there must be privity of estate between 
covenantor and covenantee, and the benefit and the burden of the covenant .must "touch 
and concern" the respective estates of the covenantor and the covenantee. Spencer's Case, 
5 Coke 16, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583). 
4 See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §121 (1939). 
5 Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576, 16 A. 799 (1889). See TIFFANY, 
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §121 (1939). 
6 Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 Ill. 318, 21 N.E. 920 (1889). 
7 Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912). ·Toe great weight of authority is 
to the contrary. See Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., note 6 supra; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 
3d ed., §123 (1939). 
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There are two basic theories as to the nature of a mortgage; the title 
theory and the lien theory. In the former, the mortgage is an absolute con-
veyance and the mortgagor has no right to possession unless the mort-
gage, or quite commonly a statute, provides for retention of possession. 
In lien states, a mortgage is merely a security device, legal title being 
retained by the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale. Where the title 
theory is followed the mortgagee of the term is an assignee whether or 
not he enters into possession, as long as he has the right to do so.8 
Though it has been argued that since the mortgagor has a right to a re-
conveyance upon discharge of the debt he retains an interest in the trans-
ferred lease,9 this has been rejected on the ground that the mortgage, where 
no right of possession has been reserved, or the mortgage plus default where 
such a right has been reserved, is a conveyance of the lessee's entire interest 
and creates privity of estate.1° On the other hand, among the states which 
follow the lien theory of mortgages and have litigated the issue, there is a 
split of authority. One view, originating in New York,11 is that a mortgagee 
of the term who enters into possession of the mortgaged premises12 thereby 
acquires the entire interest of the mortgagor and becomes an assignee.ta 
The reasoning is that once the mortgagee has taken possession he is en-
titled to all the benefits of the lease and should therefore be subjected to 
all the burdens. The other view, originating in California,14 is that the 
mere acquisition of possession by the mortgagee does not vest him with the 
entire interest of the mortgagor and that therefore he is not liable for rent 
under the lease.15 In the principal case, the court rejected a prior Texas 
8 Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. &: B. 238, 129 Eng. Rep. 714 (1819), rejecting Eaton 
v. Jacques, 2 Doug. 455, 99 Eng. Rep. 290 (1780); Williams v. Safe Deposit&: Trust Co., 167 
Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934). 
9 See note 7 supra. A court using the title theory but adhering to this view would 
logically have to reach the result of the principal case, since there would be no privity of 
estate. See principal case at 51. 
10 Williams v. Bosanquet, note 8 supra. Cf. Williams v. Safe Deposit &: Trust Co., 
note 8 supra. 
11 Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 603 (1830). 
12 It is not at all clear from the cases when a mortgagee will be considered as being 
in possession. Clearly, physical possession is sufficient and the giving of a lease by the 
mortgagee seems to be enough. See Studebaker Corp. v. Aetna Savings &: Trust Co., (7th 
Cir. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 385. Cf. Johnson v. Sherman, 15 Cal. 287 (1860). Although there are 
no cases in point, it appears that the mere right to enter into possession is not sufficient. 
It might be otherwise where possession had actually been taken and then abandoned, the 
right to re-enter being retained. See Walton v. Cronly's Administrator, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 
63 (1835). 
13 Astor v. Hoyt, note 11 supra; Olcese v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 114 III. App. 597 
(1908). But see David Bradley &: Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 99 Ill. App. 427 (1902); Stude-
baker Corp. v. Aetna Savings &: Trust Co., note 12 supra. Cf. McKee v. Angelrodt, 16 Mo. 
283 (1852); Walton v. Cronly's Administrator, note 12 supra. 
14 Johnson v. Sherman, note 12 supra. 
15 Johnson v. Sherman, note 12 supra; Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 28, 41 P. (2d) 
490 (1935). Cf. Detroit Trust Co. v. Mortensen, 273 Mich. 407, 263 N.W. 409 (1935); 
Johnson v. Commercial State Bank, 142 Neb. 752, 7 N.W. (2d) 654 (1943). Se also 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §9.6, 361 (1952) (adopting the California view). 
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decision16 which had followed the New York view, and instead adopted the 
reasoning of California. It would seem difficult to support the New York 
view since it is clear that the mortgagee, even though in possession, lacks 
legal title.17 Furthermore, the view that privity of estate, a rather tech-
nical doctrine, depends on such principles as equating burdens with bene-
fits finds no support elsewhere. In addition, it is even doubtful that equi-
table principles require that a mortgage, coupled with possession of the 
premises in the mortgagee, be considered an assignment of the mortgagor's 
entire interest. The lessor has relied on the credit of the lessee and has 
an action against him for the rent.18 The position of the mortgagee in 
possession is not analogous to that of an assignee. An assignee has the same 
rights as to retention of profits as were enjoyed by the lessee, while the 
mortgagee must apply all the proceeds of the business to the discharge of 
the debt and does not therefore enjoy the independent status of an as-
signee.19 Moreover, when operation of the business proves fruitless and is 
abandoned, it seems especially harsh to burden the mortgagee further with 
the rent obligation. Thus whether the question is determined on the basis 
of traditional legal logic or the balancing of equities the California view 
appears to be the better solution.20 The mortgagee should be recognized 
for what he really is, a security holder who does not in any real sense take the 
place of the lessee. 
Michael B. Lewiston, S.Ed. 
16 Cockrell v. Houston Packing Co., 105 Tex. 283, 147 S.W. 1145 (1912). 
17 Slaughter v. Bemads, 97 Wis. 184, 72 N.W. 977 (1897). Cf. Trimm v. Marsh, 54 
N.Y. 599 (1874); Hewen Co. v. Thibaut Realty Co., 154 Misc. 687, 277 N.Y. S. 860 (1935). 
18 This is true even where there has been an assignment. Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray 
(Mass.) 256 (1855). 
19 Cf. Cargill v. Thompson, 57 Minn. 534, 59 N.W. 638 (1894). 
20 The California view has recently been adopted by several other jurisdictions con-
sidering the question for the first time. Slane v. Polar Oil Co., note 15 supra. Cf. Detroit 
Trust Co. v. Mortensen, note 15 supra; Johnson v. Commercial State Bank, note 15 supra; 
Hausman &: Sons, Inc. v. Central Home Trust Co., ll8 N.J.L. 104, 191 A. 301 (1937). 
